The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 465 434

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 563 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a [316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 668 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 ● 565 668 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise, when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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century Mykola Mikhnovsky had issued a call for an independent state and for a while he had exerted a strong influence upon such future Ukrainian leaders as Symon Petlyura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Chekhovsky, but his ideas of placing national liberation in the forefront seemed too extreme for his adherents and by 1917 many of these had in a sense fallen away from his advanced position.

On the other hand, two and a half years of war had shown to many of the Ukrainian officers and men in the Russian army the need of a disciplined force to uphold the national cause. Some of the Ukrainian regiments had early joined the forces of the Revolution, had adopted the Ukrainian flag and introduced Ukrainian as the language of command. Now at the Military Congresses which were held in Kiev in 1917, they took a strong stand in their demands that the Ukrainian National Rada adopt a firm policy toward St. Petersburg and the Provisional Government and they were willing to go much further than the Rada in the setting up of independent governmental machinery.

Opposed to this group were the great mass of the peasants. They were little aware of the involved task of governing or even maintaining order. It would be hardly fair to say that they were anarchistic in temperament. They had rather maintained almost unconsciously their Ukrainian character. Few of them had been further from their villages than the nearest administrative centre and they could not see the necessity of substituting another regime on a broad scale for the fallen tsarist system. For decades they had attributed all their hardships and difficulties to the tsar, the bureaucrats and the police, and with all three vanished, they had no desire to replace them. It seemed to them that the land was intended by God for their use, and once the landlords were dispossessed, they were ready to forget the past and live in peace and quiet with their neighbors. Two and a half years of war had taught them the folly of organized destruction and they willingly accepted the position that a new world had come into being in which there was no need for complicated forms of government, for the collection of taxes and the enforced maintenance of order.

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as
● 565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian
668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even
665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic. He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
● [565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

[423] The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collective system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analyse]

186 668* based its authority on symbols of universality rather than national exclusivism.[15]

186 665 565 The claims of the Russian Empire to acceptance, however, were weakened by its failure to solve social questions. However much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not to a large extent corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality coincided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely Jewish. Under such circumstances, any nationalist movement was likely to become a class movement as well, a movement whose leaders would stress agrarian reform and liberation of the peasant from "exploiting" groups.

186 668* It was in this way, of course, that Ukrainian nationalism became a rival of Communism. Basically, Communism[16] in the Russian Empire in the period before and during the Revolution of 1917, was a movement of townspeople. Both its ideology and its practical possibilities induced it to seek especially the support of the urban industrial workers, led and inspired by a group of dissident intellectuals. The latter were drawn from all the nations of the tsarist realm, but were predominantly Russian and Jewish. The workers were predominantly Russian, and those few Ukrainian laborers who had settled permanently in the cities prior to 1917 had for the most part become Russified in speech and consciousness. But the Communist leadership, with its sharp insight into the real social conditions of the country, realized that no purely urban movement could succeed in a country four-fifths peasant; hence, it sought, especially after the March Revolution

[15] An especially interesting treatment of this aspect of the Russian Empire is presented by Hans Rothfels in *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken: Vortrag bei der öffentlichen Sitzung der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Königsberg am 12 Januar 1930, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 7. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Heft 4* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1930).

[16] Actually the "Bolshevik" faction of the Social Democratic Party in Russia did not adopt the designation "Communist" until 1917. To avoid confusion, however, the latter term has been used throughout this study for the essentially continuous movement.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close, the educated classes in the Ukraine were deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for advancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Nationalist movements throughout the world have usually been the work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[475] cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class
●565 on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which
517 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components
186 of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 4, 1942, p. 2).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

activist movement like the OUN to youth, or by the latter's desire in other cases to rearrange life to suit themselves. There is a faint suggestion that the Soviet regime may already have become the "old order" against which revolutionary youth is wont to rebel. On the other hand, these very qualities which made the nationalist *political* movement attractive to the younger generation had the effect of keeping it antagonistic to religion. As has already been pointed out, there is almost universal agreement that youth in the East Ukraine was cool, even hostile, to the churches.[29] In the south, the Protestants and dissident Orthodox groups seem to have been somewhat more successful, but they had no direct relation to the nationalist movement.[30]

The OUN-B, it will be recalled, placed special emphasis on securing the allegiance of youth, since its young agitators were unable to attract the support of the intelligentsia.[31] There is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the nationalist movements attracted a broader occupational group from the youth than from among its elders. So little is known concerning the role of the laboring classes, however, that no conclusions can be offered. Historically, the working class in the East Ukraine had been predominantly Russian or Russified. The working class was also generally more loyal to the Soviet system than most of the other social groups. Even if the Ukrainian claim that a large influx of dispossessed peasants and their children during the thirties had resulted in a Ukrainization of the urban laboring class be accepted, there is no evidence that such persons became interested in politics or had any important part in nationalist activity. Probably those who were mature when they left the village continued to be peasants in outlook, while a few rose into the intelligentsia, acquiring its coloration.

As frequently observed in this study, the disproportion of material available is no sure indication of a corresponding difference in the importance of factors involved. Since in many instances only fragmentary evidence is at hand, what is presented may be

[29] Cf. articles in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 12, 1941, p. 3; October 3, 1942, p. 2.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2; PS 1693.
[31] See the clandestine leaflet from the Odessa area previously referred to for sharp OUN-B criticism of the intelligentsia as tools of the Germans.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

000 drawn too heavily from particular sources or may too greatly concern special aspects. In the case of urban-rural differences in nationalist activity, it is certain that such a bias exists in the character and extent of the evidence. For one thing, any single activity in a city of some size, such as the development of a Prosvita society, or the control of an administration, is sufficiently important to merit a place in contemporary reports, while a similar rural activity, conducted on a much smaller scale but equally important in its limited area, would probably pass unrecorded. Since the main channels of communication—newspapers and personal contacts of West Ukrainian and émigrés with local figures—were predominantly urban, they would naturally leave behind many more reports on city developments. Perhaps most important is the fact that the higher degree of articulateness of urban dwellers, in the Ukraine as elsewhere, tends to give them a disproportionate share in the written expression which later becomes the historical record.

565 186 369 In the cities, there was no positive goal to compete with the nationalist movements for the hopes and enthusiasms of the populace. The terrible deprivations, the German executions, the *Ostarbeiter* program, the fear of Communist agents, were factors which had a far greater significance for the average urban person than did the efforts of the nationalist movements; but a general effect was to promote passivity and resignation. On the land, however, a positive goal was before all eyes, which for a large segment of the peasantry far outweighed any prospect of national independence, however desirable that might be in itself.[32] This transcendent goal was the destruction of the collectivized system of agriculture and its replacement by a system in which individual initiative and the demands of the peasants would play a greater part. The nature of the agrarian question and the Germans' fumbling efforts to use the peasants' desire to gain support, while retaining the old restrictive kolkhoz system to make exploitation of the peasant easier, has already been described in general terms; it would exceed the scope of this study to treat the subject itself

565 186

[32] This is implied even by nationalist writers; for example, Iurii Tarkovych notes that the first question of peasants in the area between Kiev and Chernigov was, "When will the land be divided?" (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.
[39] PS 1693.
[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.
[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.

[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.

[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda, or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members, they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.
[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

517 the Russian Ukraine had resource to Galician publications and, from time to time, they published their own works in that country. It is as a result of this that the Chevtchenko Society was founded at Lvov, which has since held the predominant place in the Ukrainian movement.

Following the example of Chevtchenko, another influence joined the popular so to say 'folk-lore' tendency of the literary Ukrainian movement: it was the social question, identical with that which dominated the literary spirit of the whole of Russia.

565 668 The second half of the eighteenth century, which had seen the union of Western Ukraine with Russia and the colonization of the shores of the Black Sea, was at the same time the epoch of the greatest development of the privileges of the aristocracy. We shall not be able to go into the details of this evolution, which would go far beyond the purpose of this book. Let us only note that after the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the new nobility, of military origin, became the greatest political force in the State. This nobility definitely emancipated itself from its old bondage to the State and at the same time transformed the dependence of the peasants, which had hitherto not been unconditional, into a real servitude. Thus Catherine II established in Russia, as also in the Ukraine, a new political and social order which was founded on the privileged position of the aristocracy which had carried her to power, and on the servitude of the peasants. She conferred similar rights on the Ukrainian nobility as those of the aristocracy of the whole empire and, moreover, liberally distributed the new lands to the landlords. Since that time the question of the servitude of the peasants, a distant but direct prelude of the Revolution, became an open wound of the Tsarist regime.

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central Powers came into Ukraine. 728

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrainian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution: 669 665

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia. 185 423

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discontent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The representatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council. [563] 727 565

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

727 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian move-
565 ment and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivi-
sible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Luden-
dorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a
restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out
of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the
727 hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place
565 in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on
April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of
big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoro-
padsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of
the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and,
though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with
the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman
of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukra-
inian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democra-
tic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws
and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Pro-
visional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to
the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that fav-
oured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the
Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that re-
cently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists
under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Repub-
lic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
[111] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost ex-
clusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'puni-
tive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed
gangs having support from German and Austrian army detach-
ments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peas-
ants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peas-
ants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Sko-
ropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces
among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which
dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approba-
tion among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General
642 Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared
after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life.

(D) Social

The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers.

But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i. e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of education, and in their occupations. The bulk (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73; Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

Land Tenure[1].—While Great Russia is at present a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

son inherits his father's house, since the elder son has started a new house and received his share during his father's life. If a member of the *ognishche* had not enough land, he migrated.

This old custom of family ownership was the basis of the Cossack communities, which differed from the *mir* in that, as the Cossacks gave little attention to cultivation and paid no taxes, the re-allotment of their lands was not necessary, though in theory every Cossack had the same right to the land. However, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the 'elders' of the Cossacks began to appropriate more land than the commoners. After Russia had subdued the Ukraine, the commoners were turned into peasants (in 1763 and 1783), and the 'elders' were given titles of nobility in 1785. After the final introduction of serfdom into the Ukraine, the taxes were equally imposed, and therefore communal ownership on the Moscow lines was introduced, though it never had such success as in Great Russia. Remnants of *ognishches* still exist in the Governments of Chernigov and Poltava, whither it was brought by the Ukrainian colonists, though individual ownership is now predominant. In some cases, though each house owns some land privately, there are other lands, meadows, and fishing rights which belong to all the village community, and are re-allotted from time to time.

In the Ukraine, as it was immediately before the war, all the land was divided into individual and communal property. The individual property consisted of (1) State lands, (2) Imperial family appanages, (3) Church and monastery lands, (4) town lands, (5) nobles' lands, and (6) lands belonging to others than nobles. The communal property was held by the peasant and village communities. Individual ownership prevails in the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (50·4 per cent. in 1905), Kherson (51·5 per cent.), Taurida (52·6 per cent.). Then come the Governments of the south-west, Volhynia (48·9 per cent.), Kiev (45·2 per cent.), Podolia (44·4 per cent.). The eastern

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of Volhynia and Podolia conditions are better, and the peasants have larger holdings, though only 16 per cent. own above five *desyatines*; in Kharkov, 33 per cent. own above five *desyatines*. In no place do the Ukrainian peasants equal in land-ownership the German and Czech colonists. The average holding among the German colonists is from 10 to 12 *desyatines*, and they specialize in cattle-breeding. The Czechs are concentrated in south-western Volhynia (in the districts of Dubno, Rovno, and Lutsk); and their average holding is 13 *desyatines*. The peasants' holdings are in a striking contrast to the big estates. In the Kiev Government there are some 43 estates of above 5,000 *desyatines* each, mostly owned by the nobles (some of them descendants of the old independent dukes, *knaz*) of Russian, Polish, or German nationality.

About 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Kiev, and Chernigov are occupied in industries other than agricultural. Trade occupies between 6 and 7 per cent. of the population in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, Podolia, and Taurida.

General Observations

Ukrainian Nationalism.—The feeling of nationality, as it exists to-day, dates from Chmielnicki's rising in 1648. The old history of Kiev-Russ is common to Great Russians, White Russians, and the Ukrainians (Little Russians), and has been continued after the Tatar invasions chiefly in Great Russia, while the Ukraine ever since has been subject to one of her neighbours. Since Chmielnicki's time, the Ukrainian nationality has made progress only in one direction, i.e. in producing a small but energetic *intelligentsia*, which does not consider itself Russian or Polish in addition to being Ukrainian, though it is obliged to seek its higher education in Russia, Poland, and other foreign countries. The national feeling of this class is

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 different from that of the bulk of the peasants, whose
565 local differences in dialects and customs are sufficiently great to obscure the idea of national unity understood by the *intelligentsia*. Not only has the Dnieper peasant no conception of a Ruthenian in Eastern Galicia, but he knows very little more about the Don or Kuban Ukrainian. But all these peasants, now as in the time of Chmielnicki, are conscious of their social and economic disabilities, and also of the fact that all the business and management of the country is in the hands of rich and educated foreigners.

Hence, the so-called feeling of nationality of the Ukrainian peasant is based on social unrest; and nationalist enthusiasm was aroused on that ground by the Rada and the Soviets of 1917, as it had been by Chmielnicki 250 years before. As soon as Chmielnicki's rising became political rather than social in aim, it failed, and even its foreign supporters did not save it. ! The same can be said about the nationalist movement of the Rada Directory of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia*. It went down before the Soviets because it was too political, while the Soviets are more intent upon social conditions.

The military strength of the Ukrainian nationalists is less now than it was in the time of Chmielnicki, since the strong military class of original Cossacks on which Chmielnicki relied either disappeared through successful Russian repressions or else amalgamated with the present Cossack community of the Don and the Kuban, which is only partly Ukrainian and has different political and social predilections. On the other hand, the rivalry between Russia, Austria, and the Poles, and the respective propaganda of the three rivals, have created among the *intelligentsia* of the Ukraine a feeling of self-confidence and a political programme that surpass Chmielnicki's and Mazeppa's dreams. In the struggle between Nationalist and Socialist interests, the bulk of the population has in the last three years given precedence to the latter; and it is still uncertain whether the peasants will care to support the

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ideals of the *intelligentsia*, if the latter cannot provide them with the economic advantages to which they aspire.

The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i. e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire. It is a well-defined geographical unit with most favourable economic conditions, but the people living in these lands do not form a homogeneous nation of one linguistic, social, and cultural type. The essentially Ukrainian country lies on both sides of the Dnieper. In the Don and Kuban regions, the Ukrainian colonists were preceded by the Great-Russian colonists, in Eastern Galicia by the Poles. But it is true that during the time of the greatest Russian oppression Eastern Galicia played the part of Piedmont for the *intelligentsia* from the Russian Ukraine. The nine Governments grouped by the Russian Administration into (1) South-west Territory (Podolia, Volhynia, and Kiev), (2) Malorossiya (Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov), and (3) Novorossiya (only Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav out of the five Governments of Novorossiya), have a population which is preponderantly Ukrainian in the rural districts; in the towns the Ukrainians are outnumbered by Jews, Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Italians, &c.

It is remarkable how small a part is played by the *intelligentsia* in industry and trade, in the Church, and in legal and educational institutions. All Ukrainians are agriculturists, but in most cases they are merely labourers, not concerned with the management of agricultural industries. Since 1905, however, the co-operative societies have brought to the Ukrainian peasant the social education which the *mir* gave to the Great-Russian peasant in the two last centuries. The claim, therefore, that these nine Governments are Ukrainian means that people speaking various Ukrainian dialects and having similar customs inhabit them, though, so far, they have not managed it politically, socially, or culturally, and are hardly likely to do

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

565 so efficiently without the help of educated foreigners
184 for some generations to come.

000 *The Ukraine and Great Russia.*—The future of the Ukraine affects Great Russia in the first instance. If the Ukraine is permanently severed from Great Russia, the latter will have to limit itself to the 'Moscow-Siberian' Empire, for it is hardly likely that any other native states formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire (Azerbaijan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the North Caucasian Republic, White Russia) would then belong to her. There seems to be a similarity between these states and the Ukraine, in that they all refuse to recognize Russian suzerainty, though they may possibly join Russia as states with equal rights. The Ukraine is the largest and richest of these states, so that she might play a determining part in their negotiation with Great Russia if she produces the necessary statesman. On the other hand, small as these other states are, they are more homogeneous ethnically and more advanced culturally than the Ukraine, and are able, with the exception of White Russia, to carry on political and economic affairs by themselves.

The Ukraine and Poland.—Poland and the Ukraine are neighbours who supplement each other in the economic sphere; and Poland has many men of education and enterprise. But good relations depend largely on the issue of the political conflict within the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists claim Galicia as far as the River San, while the Poles, especially the Galician Poles, claim it all for Poland. The ethnic boundary is roughly along the River Bug. In the Eastern Galician problem lies the most serious danger of quarrel.

563 The next interest of Poland is in her minorities in Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. They consist of noble landowners or professionals in the towns, some of them men whose families have lived there for the last four or five centuries. The reverse is the case of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The Polish minorities in the Russian Ukraine are much smaller, but in

464 districts through the long winter has led to the creation of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel, Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful, 221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any 511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to 565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

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this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid work in the towns, and both men and women have often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

alleviate these conditions various measures have been adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguishing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated on the three-field system, each unit of land being planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and, in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

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741 Of greatest significance for the advancement 517 of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 217 cation and public health. The society for popular education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

000 All the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Lwów and its environs, men and women, were represented, the consulates of Great Britain and France and many foreigners who love Ukrainian music - all but the Poles.

577 Intelligentsia - that is, students of the classical schools and universities, teachers, professors, lawyers, the heads of the cooperatives, editors, writers, painters, politicians, architects, graduate agriculturists, engineers, physicians, clergymen. They were all there.* One saw remarkably many clergymen, fine men who have both feet planted firmly on Ukrainian soil. Many of them were Austrian officers in their younger days who also fought for West Ukrainian freedom. They told friends that they were prepared at any time /99/ "to exchange the cassock for a coat of mail". This is no empty talk, for most of them had already paid for their national sentiments in Polish prisons. Their metropolitan, Count Andrei Sheptyckij, is cut from the same pattern. He incurred the hatred of the Poles when he blessed the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine and half a year later its dead. Before he was drawn to the church, he, the cavalry captain of his Majesty, hunted bears, lynxes and wild boars. The trophies from that gay time are now hanging in the anteroom of the archbishop. Today he is an old man who has been in ill health for a long time. Years ago the tall, vigorous man was often compared to Michelangelo's Moses.

Count Andrei Sheptycki was a member of the Polonized Ukrainian high nobility. Like many Polish aristocrats with Ukrainian coats of arms, his brothers belonged to the Polish szlachta; he alone found his way home to the Ukrainian people. Neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians have a dearth of nobility. In Volhynia "the 16th and 17th centuries fairly seethed with princely houses". Whenever the Polish kings needed warriors for their expeditions, they raised the wealthy peasants to

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* [At a Ukrainian concert in Lwów, incidental to the information - Analyst]

the peerage and gave them rights and privileges for which the newly-created peers were obliged to pay with military service. In this way the lower szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands of knights and barons who were often not much richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still whole villages in which every peasant belongs to the nobility. Whoever was able to present his patent of nobility in Galicia after the partitioning of Poland was recognized as a peer by the Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter /knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the exception of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky, does not play any part in promoting culture in modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility were for a long time practically the only bearers of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their numerous children were often the only and the inexhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia. Otherwise there were no intellectual professions open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". According to the latest Polish conception, the lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles. By promising them additional land and other material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the 400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had succeeded, the Poles would have come a good deal closer to a majority in Galicia.

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"In this cottage, in this grove
A hell I saw! Nothing but slavery
And bitter servitude, that never justice knows